“That’s a stretch. Besides, we have no evidence that Gaddafi succeeded in enriching uranium to the level needed to build a bomb. Even when he was trying to assemble one he didn’t succeed, because it’s not so simple. And in the unlikely event that he succeeded, who is the threat now? The pro-Gaddafi opposition? I highly doubt that they would ever consider destroying their own country.”
Even though Crocker wanted to focus on his wife, he knew the UF6 was important and that Remington’s line of reasoning was unsound. “What about al-Qaeda?” he asked.
“They don’t have a strong presence here. Besides, we keep them closely monitored.”
“What if my team and I take a look around the Tajoura Nuclear Research Center?”
“That’s not necessary. The center is inspected routinely by the IAEA.”
Crocker said, “Is this about not wanting to question the authority or the effectiveness of the NTC?”
Remington said bluntly, “I’ll expect the report on my desk tomorrow. Thanks.”
Crocker hung up with Jabril’s message burning in his head.
Akil asked, “What did he want, boss?”
“Pack the truck. You and Mancini and I are going out again. Tell Ritchie and Davis I want them to stay here by the phone in case there’s any news.”
“Yes, sir.”
They spent several hours driving the coast road east in the direction of Sirte and stopped at NATO headquarters, where Crocker was kept waiting half an hour only to be told that all NATO units in the country had been alerted to report any information relating to Holly and Brian Shaw’s location.
Then they drove south to NTC headquarters. No news there, either. Just a promise from the colonel in charge that he would alert the U.S. embassy the minute he had news.
Finally, they entered some of the poorer neighborhoods on the edge of the desert packed with ramshackle mud structures and tents. They showed Holly’s photo to women cooking and mending clothes, men drinking tea and attending to camels. All they got back were shrugs and suspicious looks. No clues.
“Now where, boss?” Mancini asked.
Crocker’s frustration level was almost unbearable. He looked at the map and saw that they were only a short distance from the Tajoura Nuclear Research Center. He said, “Let’s call the house one more time, then take a quick look at the nuclear center.”
“Why?”
“Duty. Dr. Jabril’s letter. A vague hunch.”
Mancini: “Didn’t you ask Remington, and he told you not to?”
“He said it wasn’t necessary. I think he’s wrong, and it’s too important to ignore. Let’s go.”
Crocker picked up the information packet Volman had given him and handed it to Akil, who read it out loud. The Tajoura Nuclear Research Center consisted of a ten-megawatt pool-type reactor, a neutron generator complex, and radiochemical laboratories containing gas centrifuges for the production of isotopes for use in agriculture, medicine, biology, and industry. The center also included a research laboratory, machine shop, and computer center.
The main reactor had been built by the Soviets in 1979. At one time the center was staffed by as many as 750 Libyan scientists and technicians. Now the only thing in operation was a German-built reverse-osmosis desalination plant that produced over ten thousand gallons of potable water a day.
As the black Suburban turned into a wooded area that led to the main gate, Akil read from a series of IAEA reports. The agency had been established in 1957 to promote the peaceful use of atomic energy and to inhibit its use for any military purpose, including nuclear weapons. According to one of the documents, Libya had begun receiving nuclear-weapons-related aid from Dr. A. Q. Khan, chief architect of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program and proliferator of nuclear technologies to Iran and North Korea, starting in 1997. Khan had supplied Libya with twenty assembled L-1 centrifuges and two tons of UF6—enough to build a single nuclear weapon.
In early 2002, U.S. intelligence officials discovered that Khan had also provided the Libyans with the blueprint for making a fission-type weapon that the Chinese had tested in the late 1960s. This document set forth the design parameters and engineering specifications for constructing an implosion weapon weighing over a thousand pounds that could be delivered by an aircraft or missile.
After the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, which Gaddafi denounced, he sought to make peace with the United States and offered to dismantle all of his WMD programs. According to CIA analysis, several factors contributed to Gaddafi’s decision. First, thirty years of UN economic sanctions had significantly limited oil exports and hurt the Libyan economy. Second, Libya’s nuclear program had progressed slowly and was extremely expensive. Third, the elimination of WMDs was a prerequisite to normalizing relations with the West. Fourth, Gaddafi wanted to avoid the fate that Saddam Hussein had suffered in Iraq. Finally, CIA operatives had seized a shipment of centrifuge-related equipment bound for Libya in October 2003, which may have persuaded Gaddafi that he would have great difficulty procuring materials needed for the manufacture of WMDs in the future.