Raid on the Sun(9)

Hamza found that within a year of its purchase, the Russian reactor had begun to leak radioactive contaminated water. It seemed that when it came time to clean the reactor core, a normal process of maintenance, the Soviet technicians and sales personnel claimed that maintenance was not covered in the original contract. “This is your responsibility, not ours,” the on-site engineers informed the Iraqis. The Iraqi technicians at Atomic Energy had no experience in maintaining nuclear reactors. Not one of its members had the vaguest idea of how to clean the inside of a nuclear reactor. Certainly there were no tools or provisions for such an undertaking at al-Tuwaitha.

Atomic Energy administrators elected to contract the work out to a private industrial cleaning service in Baghdad. The workers at the company were experienced in cleaning and scrubbing industrial warehouses and fabrication plants, even chemical laboratories and production facilities. But not one of them had ever seen a reactor before, much less cleaned one. In the end the maintenance workers relied on what they had always done. They entered the mathematically smooth, precisely engineered seamless environment of the reactor core and began scouring the pristine walls with wire brushes and industrial cleaning fluids, as though the reactor were just another dirty factory floor in need of a good scrubbing. Unbeknownst to the maintenance crew, or to the Iraqi engineers and nuclear techs who ran the reactor, the wire brushes scratched and grooved the pristine surfaces of the core’s containment vessel. These minute divots and engraved lines created weak spots on the surface. When the reactor was activated again, the superheated steam and extreme temperatures soon corroded the breaches in the surface, eating away at the material until the core began leaking the moderating water around the fuel rods. When Atomic Energy complained to the Soviet techs that the core was leaking, the Russian liaison officers countered that they had had nothing to do with maintaining the reactor core and that the decision to hire an outside, incompetent firm to undertake such a delicate process was solely the responsibility of the Iraqis. Iraq was left with an undersized and now unusable reactor.

Khidhir Hamza put all the details of the ten-year Soviet administration and shepherding of Iraq’s nuclear energy programs in his report. He handed the finished document to AE at the end of 1971. The reaction to the report was not long in coming. Saddam Hussein may have been a bit of a rube when it came to nuclear technology dealmaking, but he was a fast learner. Just months after receiving Hamza’s paper, Hussein in early 1972 ordered all Soviet personnel out of the country. Simultaneously he froze the balance of the remaining payments due the Soviet union   and directed that it be held in escrow according to international procedure. He also informed Moscow that he would pay only five hundred thousand dollars—and he would pay that balance in Russia’s own rapidly falling rubles. The deal was “take it or leave it.”

His part in the humiliation of the Soviets made Hamza something of a local hero at Atomic Energy. The engineer was given a raise and increased responsibilities. The Research Center’s new director, Husham Sharif, a small, cultured man who had replaced the lower-bred Attia, began currying favor with his new star scientist. Even Dr. Moyesser al-Mallah, the secretary general of Atomic Energy, began dropping by Khidhir Hamza’s small office for an occasional cup of tea. One evening, curiously, al-Mallah requested that Hamza and Sharif come home with him after work so they could talk in “private.” Hamza drove to the man’s house, located in an upscale suburb of Baghdad reserved for officials of the Ba’th Party. He felt anxious, wondering what al-Mallah could want that was so important they needed to meet in secret. Hamza and Sharif settled into al-Mallah’s comfortable den and began the usual office chitchat when Sharif suddenly changed the subject.

“What did you think of Jabir’s book?” Sharif asked, referring to the Palestinian’s much talked about study of Israel’s atomic bombs. The question, apropos of nothing, alerted Hamza that this meeting was a setup.

“I think it’s ridiculous,” Hamza replied. In truth, Hamza did not believe that Israel had the capacity to produce enough plutonium to make atomic bombs. And how could they have tested their designs to make sure their bomb worked? Certainly Israel had no Nevada test ranges. He looked at the disappointed faces of his bosses. He had given the wrong answer. He was, he realized, being arrogantly dismissive.

Al-Mallah, with some satisfaction, informed Hamza that, in fact, Saddam believed every word of the book. Not only that, but the Great Uncle had ordered the Nuclear Research Center to create an atomic bomb for Iraq. Al-Mallah then explained that if the scientists at al-Tuwaitha could not show any progress, the Great Uncle was liable to grow impatient, and that would be a danger to all of them. On the other hand, if the the three of them could come up with a viable plan, then funds, resources, and prestige would flow to them all. But, for security reasons, they would have to keep this a secret between them. Hamza felt his chest tightening. Good God, he thought, how could they possibly build a nuclear bomb? What would the West do if they found out?