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Operation Massacre(60)

By:Daniella Gitlin






35. Blind Justice


            The case went to the National Supreme Court, which, on April 24, 1957, passed one of the most shameful rulings in our judicial history, signed by all the members—Judges Alfredo Orgaz, Manuel J. Argañarás, Enrique V. Galli, Carlos Herrera, Benjamín Villegas Basavilbaso—following a prior report from the Attorney General of the Nation, Sebastián Soler.

            Once the case was transferred to a so-called military justice system that was equally complicit and partisan, this ruling is what left the crime of the José León Suárez massacre forever unpunished.

            Half a page was enough for Judge Soler to give his ruling on the events that I have recounted in this book. Here is his opinion:

            According to the statements of the declarant, the event being investigated in the proceedings was carried out by the staff of the Police Department of the Province of Buenos Aires.

            However, beginning on page 24, it appears that during the happenings of June 9, 1956, police forces acted “in accordance with military commands and authority.”

            Consequently, considering what is mandated by Article 108, paragraphs 2 and 3, and by Article 109, paragraph 6, of the Military Code of Justice, it is my opinion that the competence of the military justice court sub judice should be declared and I underscore, moreover, that this decision is supported by Article 136 of the same legal text in its stipulation that “the accountability of military authorities regarding the decrees that they pass, or of those entrusted with their application, should they overstep their authority, can only be established by military courts.”

            Note that the ruling does not even mention the basic discrepancy raised by Judge Hueyo. It tiptoes around all the significant elements of the issue. It is founded on the childish equivocation that the police were reporting to the Army during “the events of June 9, 1956,” which is false because throughout the entirety of June 9, given that no decree was enacted that day to change the situation, the police were legally subordinated not to the Army, but rather to the Governance Ministry of the Province. Moreover, though, besides being false, this is all irrelevant because Livraga’s formal accusation, which is what is being considered, refers to a crime committed on June 10, which is like saying a day later, a year later, a century later. Or is it that a famous jurist came to believe he was an angel, or a Wells character, who could play with time like this? In half a page, Judge Soler does away with everything he has taught in decades of lectures and texts.

            The Court’s ruling states:

            Findings of fact and conclusions of law:

            WHEREAS the actions that prompted this case are imputed to functionaries and employees of the Province of Buenos Aires Police, who acted during the emergency in accordance with commands and authority that were military in nature, per what is reported on page 24 by request of this Court, and what emerges as well from the proceedings is that the aforementioned events were motivated by the revolutionary movement stifled on that occasion, namely, under exceptional circumstances during which the keeping of internal order was specifically assigned to the military, according to doctrine established as of the end-date of the “Todesco, Hernando” case; and

            WHEREAS in such conditions and considering what is ordered by Article 136 of the Military Code of Justice and what has been decreed by the Attorney General, it is appropriate to declare the jurisdictional competence of the presiding military judge in this case;

            THEREFORE and given the report of the Attorney General, be it declared fitting for the proceedings to be heard by the presiding military judge, to whom the trial will be transferred.

            In the first edition of this book I said—without its occurring to anyone to sue me for contempt—that the attorney general’s report and the ruling of the Court were an evil corruption of the rule of law. I want to sum up, in the most straightforward way possible, the reasons behind this “report” that made me believe I was authorized to make such a statement.