1) Juan Carlos Livraga was condemned to death by the June 9, 1956 Decree 10.364 of the National Executive Power, the punishment to be carried out at the site of the events, in the district of San Martín, in accordance with martial law; it was not possible to complete the sentence regarding the person in question due to his having escaped moments before the execution.
2) The corresponding records of this decree can be found in the Decree Office Archives of the President of the Nation.
3) Due to the escape of the condemned, the execution could not be carried out at the time, and it was even less possible to complete it subsequently, after arresting him, as martial law had been lifted.
4) As a result, since there had been a definitive ruling on the case, it was then also impossible to have any other authority intervene, given that he had already been tried for these charges.
5) Instead, by Decree Number 11.219, he was put under the command of the National Executive Power and held in custody at the Olmos jail.
Furthermore, I would like to inform Your Honor that martial law was instated by Decree-Law 10.362, of June 9, 1956, and put into effect by Decree 10.363, also on June 9, 1956.
This latter decree establishes the following, in short:
1) While martial law is in effect, the stipulations of Law 13.234 regarding the governance of the Nation during times of war will be applied.
2) Every active officer of the armed forces carrying out his military duties will be able to call for a summary trial and have the power to apply a death sentence by execution to any disturber of the peace.
3) Any person carrying weapons, disobeying police orders, or exhibiting suspicious behavior of any kind is considered a disturber of the peace.
Since the case seems to originate with an alleged execution under abnormal circumstances, I think it fitting to note, as far as legality is concerned, that in every instance the application of these decrees requires only an oral order (Art. 138 of the Military Justice Code).
In any event, given the press scandal that, with rather unclear motives, has been unleashed regarding this issue, it is appropriate to stress that the accountability of the authorities or of those in charge of applying a military decree can only be decided effectively by military courts and not by civil magistrates (Art. 136 of the Military Code of Justice).
Remaining very sincerely yours, Your Honor.
D. A. Fernández Suárez
Lieutenant Colonel Chief of Police.
So everything was legal. Livraga had been executed in compliance with a decree. There is just one tiny detail: the decree does not exist. Or rather, it exists, but it does not affect him at all, because it is a list of military personnel condemned to death, and it does not include Livraga.
Fernández Suárez’s argument is one more blatant lie to add to all the previous ones.
As for the “press scandal”: it was an exaggeration to give such a label to the articles I had printed out on a little sheet of paper that was hardly even circulated—articles which constituted the only reference to the matter that could be found in the press at the time.
Judge Hueyo understood that the issue of jurisdictional competence had already been established by F. Suárez’s note, but he did not pass up the opportunity to tear apart the latest fabrication of this cornered military man. On page 74, he orders the following:
With the purpose of resolving the issue of jurisdictional competence that has been established, to send an official letter to the judge currently presiding over the criminal court of the Capital asking him to demand from wherever necessary, and as a matter of urgency, authenticated copies of decree numbers 10.362, 10.363 and 10.364, as well as the date and exact time that they were in effect.