Still, there was something missing from this evidence: the document based on Livraga’s formal accusation that was prepared by Judge Belisario Hueyo in La Plata.
I knew the basic contents of this document, but I only held a photocopy of it in my hands when the first edition of this book had already been published (1957).
I was then able to compare the two investigations, the judge’s and mine. The two are practically identical and round each other out. In some ways, mine was more detailed: it included signed statements from the survivors. Judge Hueyo could not take statements from Troxler, Benavídez, and Gavino because they were in Bolivia. I had records of interviews with Horacio di Chiano, Torres, “Marcelo,” and dozens of minor witnesses who did not go through an official intake of any kind. And I had a photostatic copy of the State Radio registry book of announcers, which established the time at which martial law was instated.
In other ways, the Livraga file goes beyond what I could have imagined. In addition to being the official account of the case, it contains confessions from the executioners themselves.
It is therefore this file that, as of the second edition of this book (1964), I call upon as evidence.
My personal experience with judges, as a journalist, has not been encouraging. I could name a dozen whom I know to be factious, inept, or simply corrupt. I choose instead to offer, as a model of determination, speed, and efficiency, the actions of Judge Hueyo throughout this case.
The way he carried out his investigation was truly exemplary. He does the justice system of this country an honor.
The Livraga file begins on December 14, 1956, with the report he gave to Judge Viglione who, for reasons of jurisdictional competence, remits it to Judge Hueyo five days later.
It is a detailed account of his arrest, transfer to the San Martín District Police Department, failed execution, brief stay at the San Martín polyclinic, imprisonment in Moreno, and recovery in Olmos. It includes a piece of physical evidence: a small square of paper dated June 10, 1956 at the San Martín District Police Department, with signatures from three officers confirming that “a White Star watch, a key ring, ten pesos and a handkerchief” were confiscated from Livraga that night.
There are three mistakes in the report that would make the judge’s investigation (and my own) more difficult. It says there were five men arrested in the back apartment of the house in Florida when there were at least eight. It says there were ten of them taken out in the assault car to be executed when there were at least twelve. It claims there were two survivors (he and Giunta) when in reality there were seven. Of all of them, he only knew Vicente Rodríguez, who was dead. And as for the executioners, he only knows that they were policemen from the Province.
The places and events, on the other hand, are described with photographic precision.
On December 24, Judge Hueyo issues the first orders: to ask the head of the Presidential Military House, by way of an subpoena, to identify “which reports were used to draft the telegram” where it is stated that Livraga was injured during a shooting; to send an official letter to the Chief of Police requesting that he report whether Livraga was detained in mid-June at the San Martín District Police Department and at Moreno, then at Olmos, and to identify “the judge who was in charge of his case”; to solicit the same reports from the head of the San Martín District Police Department, the commissioner in Moreno, and the director of the penitentiary in Olmos; and finally, to ask the San Martín polyclinic if Livraga received treatment there (page 26).
The head of the Presidential Military House, Captain Manrique, was a busy man: he never responded. Fernández Suárez will only respond one month later, when the complicity of the central government has already been ascertained.
The San Martín District Police Department, on the other hand, replies immediately: “On the requested date I report no record exists detention Juan Carlos Livraga.” The telegram (p. 27) is signed by O. de Bellis, who has replaced Rodríguez Moreno as chief of the department.