But focusing on the “far enemy” made it harder to build a movement. At the time, nearly all other terrorist organizations had regional or irredentist aims—fighting for Palestine or Kashmir or overthrowing the government of Libya or of Egypt. Concrete grievances and feasible projects were more appealing to recruits. Al Qaeda had no single front where it could make its name, so bin Laden attempted to fold the specific political fights into an age-old religious war. He talked not of American policy in the Middle East but of the “Jewish-Crusader” crimes against Muslims. He unified these conflicts, from the Sahara to Asian jungles, by reminding his listeners of the common humiliation of Muslims, everywhere abetted by the United States. In this way, the feasibility of bin Laden’s project became secondary to the piety affirmed by fighting with Al Qaeda. They were the true Muslims, defiant amid apostasy, defending the faith from its enemies.
But even if it were nearly impossible for them to win—to destroy the United States—they would be hard to defeat.
* * *
Through the fall of 2001, XVIII Airborne Corps responded to orders to deploy forces in support of what was then called Operation Enduring Freedom. First we sent limited forces to secure an air base and logistics hub at Karshi-Khanabad in southeast Uzbekistan. Then we deployed a culled-down brigade combat team to secure Kandahar Airport. Finally, part of a division headquarters went to control operations from Bagram, a newly captured air base built by the Soviets in the 1950s and later used during the 1980s fighting.
Each deployment order we received required reshaping the units and reducing their normal combat power. Although I recognized the necessity of tailoring forces and limiting the U.S. footprint, our operations felt dangerously ad hoc. The failure to trap bin Laden in Tora Bora in December and the messy Operation Anaconda fight in the Shah-i-Kot Valley in early March 2002 seemed to validate this concern.
I was also frustrated. Watching war from afar is torturous for most soldiers, especially when comrades are fighting in difficult terrain. In Afghanistan they were engaged in fights I could watch remotely but to which I could not contribute. So it was a relief in the spring of 2002 when XVIII Airborne Corps was ordered to deploy our headquarters to establish Combined Joint Task Force 180 (CJTF 180) at Bagram and take control of all conventional military operations in the country. In May we deployed.
Deploying is always an emotional event. By nature soldiers focus on the task ahead and are usually a bit excited by the adventure. But leaving loved ones was always heart-wrenching. In some ways it got easier with practice; in others, particularly as soldiers aged, it became harder. For veterans there were fewer unknows, but life seemed more finite and the costs more clear.
My son Sam, then seventeen, tended to put things into perspective. As we prepared to deploy on a series of flights from Pope Air Force Base, I put on the distinctive sand-colored desert uniform we’d wear and said good-bye to Sam as he headed off to high school. I’d miss his graduation in two weeks. I told him I was proud of him and loved him. He asked when I’d be back.
“I’m not sure, Sam, probably when we’ve finished the job in Afghanistan,” I said, wanting to steel him for an extended tour.
Sam nodded, wished me luck, and headed off to school.
I went to the headquarters, and within a couple of hours our aircraft broke and my flight’s departure was postponed for twenty-four hours. So that evening when Sam came home, I was there.
“That job didn’t take long,” he said impishly.
* * *
Any war is serious business, but when we arrived in Afghanistan in May 2002, it wasn’t clear whether there was any war left. The hunt for Al Qaeda continued, but the Taliban seemed to have been decisively defeated; most had essentially melted away, and we weren’t sure where they’d gone. Later it became clear that some had moved to regroup in Pakistan but that most of the rank-and-file, and some senior leaders, had gone to their homes to wait and gauge the new developments.