large, roving mahaz: Before he was killed, Mullah Dadullah went on Al Jazeera and bragged about the connections between his mahaz, Al Qaeda in Iraq, and the central leadership of Al Qaeda: “We consider it a friendly and brotherly organization, which shares our ideology and concepts. We have close ties and constant contacts with it . . . may have sent our people to Iraq, and [the Iraqis] may have sent their friends to us. We have continuous contacts with them, whether by phone or by other means” (“Taliban Military Commander Mullah Dadallah: We Are in Contact with Iraqi Mujahideen, Osama bin Laden & Al-Zawahiri,” Middle East Media Research Institute, June 2, 2006).
beheadings: Dion Nissenbaum, “Knocked Out of Power in Afghan Town, Taliban Turn to Intimidation,” McClatchy, March 14, 2010. The article reports on decapitations, once a trademark of Zarqawi’s in Iraq, and a tactic that was on display in an infamous Taliban propaganda video featuring a twelve-year-old executioner, who according to the caption on the video was trained by Dadullah. Bryan Glyn Williams, “Mullah Omar’s Missiles, A Field Report on Suicide Bombers in Afghanistan,” Middle East Policy Council, Winter 2008.
pep talk to Marjah’s Taliban: In this way, as Dadullah had, the front’s new leader—Qayyum Zakir—was well known for stealing over from Pakistan to personally motivate his troops. Anand Gopal, “Qayyum Zakir: The Afganistan Taliban’s Rising Mastermind,” Christian Science Monitor, April 30, 2010.
sixteen key cities: Correspondence with Matt Sherman.
the only known mutiny: Hugh Kennedy, The Great Arab Conquests: How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We Live In (Da Capo Press, 2007), 194–95.
decimation of Kandahar: For a description of the devastation the Soviets wrought, see Robert Kaplan, Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Vintage, 2001), 187–88.
two hundred thousand: Ibid., 188.
Karzai walked in: The sequence of events comes from notes taken by a member of my ISAF strategic advisery group, as do the paraphrased remarks, originally transcribed from the live English translation of Karzai’s speech. Quoted remarks are from Golnar Mortevalli, “Karzai Rallies Tribes, Distances Self from West,” Reuters, April 4, 2010.
would join the Taliban: According to a CRS report, an English translation of the exact comments was never produced. Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance,” Congressional Research Service, March 30, 2012, 11.
put that trip in jeapardy: In an April 6 press briefing, a reporter asked if the White House was considering canceling Karzai’s visit. Robert Gibbs, the White House press secretary answered, “We certainly would evaluate whatever continued or further remarks President Karzai makes as to whether that’s constructive to have such a meeting, sure.” “Briefing by White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs,” White House website, April 6, 2010. Three days later, Denis McDonough said the trip was still on.
in rejection of Mullah Omar’s layha: The United Nations calculated that from January through June 2010, the insurgency killed and wounded 2,477 Afghans, a 53 percent increase from the same period in 2009, and 76 percent of all civilian casualties. ISAF and Afghan security forces, meanwhile, caused 30 percent fewer civilian casualties than they had during the first six months of 2009, decreasing their share of the civilian toll to 12 percent. “Mid Year Report 2010 Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 2010,” United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, August 2010, i–iv.
assassination campaign: Details of Taliban activity in early 2010 are from Ibid., 2–3, 6.
responsible for fewer civilian casualties: Ibid., i.