five American ambassadors: These ambassadors were Ryan Crocker, Robert Finn, Zal Khalilzad, Ronald Neumann, and William Wood. In addition, James Dobbins was the special envoy to Afghanistan, the senior civilian and U.S. representative at the Bonn Conference, so it could be said Karzai dealt with six.
eleven other ISAF commanders: Generals McColl (UK), Zorlu (Turkey), Van Heyst (Germany), Gliemeroth (Germany), Hillier (Canada), Py (France), Erdagi (Turkey), del Vecchio (Italy), Richards (UK), McNeill (USA), and McKiernan (USA) all served as the commander of ISAF.
“General, aren’t you going to wear”: Interview with Mike Hall.
“We and the people of Balkh Province”: Atta Noor’s speech was reported by Balkh TV, a news station in Mazar-e-Sharif. The newscast was translated by the BBC’s International Monitoring Service, the source of this English quote. “NATO Commander Meets Northern Afghan Governor,” BBC Monitoring South Asia, June 24, 2009.
modernity itself: A layer beneath the political power struggles for much of Afghanistan’s twentieth century was a contest between cultural conservatism and advocates of Western-influenced social progress. As a people, Afghans were conflicted over the issue. King Amanullah’s reform-focused reign, from 1919 to 1929, was a source of pride to many Afghans, but ultimately, concern over the by-products of Amanullah’s initiatives led to a conservative backlash that unseated the young king. Popular outcry over a photograph of his young queen in a sleeveless gown while on a visit to Europe is frequently cited to demonstrate the fragility of the march to modernity.
“fighting Taliban”: These classifications, and the Pashtun transliterations, can be found in Martine van Bijlert, “Unruly Commanders and Violent Power Struggles: Taliban Networks in Uruzgan,” in Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field, ed. Antonio Giustozzi (Columbia University Press, 2009), 160.
twenty fighters: While more entrenched networks, like those centered around Haqqani, Mansour, or Dadullah, were thousands strong, young upstart commanders had more modest goals. The latter case is described in an excellent chapter by Tom Coghlan, “The Taliban in Helmand: An Oral History” in Decoding the New Taliban, 142–44.
unable to fire the local commanders: The tenuous relationship between the Taliban’s central leadership and local commanders in Uruzgan is detailed in van Bijlert, “Unruly Commanders,” 169–70.
Outbreaks of insurgency: Most Taliban infiltration followed a general pattern: Sensing fertile soil, the Taliban sent a vanguard element that became a menacing presence around town who met with and co-opted local leaders who were not in power but who stood to gain from a change in the status quo. They then targeted powerful leaders, stirred sentiment, and corralled it into a sprouting resistance.
varying degrees of success: In parts of Uruzgan, for example, the Taliban’s judges and political officers often had little ability to defy the fighters. Van Bijlert, “Unruly Commanders,” 168.
one of my civilian advisers reported: Correspondence with Matt Sherman.
“What is it that we don’t understand?”: My recollection of this meeting was confirmed in an interview with Charlie Flynn.
shortage of Afghan and ISAF manpower: This shortage of troops had, in General McKiernan’s estimation, made for “a greater reliance on air” power than he would have liked. Robert Burns, “Call for Troops in Afghanistan: Promised Brigade Is Not ‘Sufficient,’” Boston Post, September 17, 2008.
Lore grew: Interview with Afghan military officer.
for years: Amy Waldman, “Afghan Leader Warily Backs U.S. Bombing,” The New York Times, January 2, 2002.