My Share of the Task(269)

                “Succeeding in Iraq”: George W. Bush, “President’s Address to the Nation,” White House, January 10, 2007.

                there were four vectors: Department of Defense, “DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Gen. Pace,” February 2, 2007.

                explosively formed projectile IEDs: In 2004 Iranian-backed Special Groups had introduced to Iraqi roads a deadly new device known as an explosively formed projectile, or EFP. For years, “shaped charges” had been used in high-tech weaponry to penetrate armor plating. In the late 1990s, however, insurgents in southern Lebanon had adapted the technology for use in portable roadside bombs against Israeli vehicles. The technology migrated from their source, Iran, to Iraq, and according to Rick Atkinson in the Washington Post (October 1, 2007) the first EFP was detonated in May 2004 in Basra. By late 2006, the device was all too common and frighteningly lethal. The large number of EFPs was clear evidence of the extent of direct Iranian involvement in the conflict.

                EFPs varied in size; most were about the size of a small oil drum or a five-gallon paint bucket, but they could be even smaller. Insurgents positioned them a few feet above the ground and aimed them to shoot laterally into the roadway. Once triggered, often by hidden infrared sensors, an explosive charge on the back of the drum forced a concave metal cone to be reshaped into a dartlike stream in the direction of the target. The dense molten stream, often the size of a bowling pin and traveling at twice the speed of a bullet, punctured inches of metal plating like water through snow. Inside the vehicle, the molten slug cut through legs and torsos, and its heat often lit the cab and the men inside on fire. Our heaviest armored vehicles were vulnerable and despite extensive countermeasures, in large numbers they were a potential game changer.

                In the early evening: One source claims the attack took place at 6:00 P.M. (Mark Kukis, “An Ambush in Karbala,” Time, July 26, 2007). Another article times the event at 5:00 P.M., providing further details about the number and line of SUVs and the PJCC. (Department of Defense, “Karbala Attackers Used U.S. Army–Styled Uniforms to Gain Access,” Armed Forces Press Service, January 26, 2007).

                wore U.S. Army uniforms: Department of Defense, “Karbala Attackers Used U.S. Army–Styled Uniforms.”

                roughly a dozen: Ibid.

                weapons through the doors: Kukis, “An Ambush in Karbala.” Details of this event draw on this article.

                suspicions about their involvement: Ibid.

                neighboring province of Babil: Borzou Daragahi, “Military Provides Details of Slain Soldiers’ Abduction,” Los Angeles Times, January 27, 2007.

                scrawled his name in the film: Kukis, “An Ambush in Karbala.”


CHAPTER 15: THE LONG WAR

                could avoid producing antibodies: Then-Major Ben Connable used this same terminology describing Abizaid’s position in volume 1 of Al-Anbar Awakening.

                eighty-five of their comrades: Casualty figures come from Smith and MacFarland, “Anbar Awakens,” 52.

                could not knowingly target: Throughout the time Task Force 17 was active, it coordinated its target list with MNF-I and the State Department. Any time it posted a slide with “SCIRI” on it—referring to one of the main political parties that used the Badr Brigade as its violent arm—embassy officials would offer fierce objections.

                feverishly triaging the material: My recollection of this event was aided by interviews with those closely involved.

                twenty-two-page document: My recollection of the contents of this material was confirmed and elaborated upon in interviews with two individuals privy to it.