just shy of the most extreme: If we wanted to excise violence from the system, Graeme’s thinking went, we needed to approach the most violent groups that could realistically be approached. Cleaving the most radical irreconcilables away from the rest—by killing and capturing them and by separating them psychologically from the people—was key to breaking their hold on the other potentially reconcilable groups. “They will poison the people on the fence,” he said.
Iraqis were fleeing every month: Sabrina Tavernise, “Civilian Death Toll Reaches New High in Iraq, U.N. Says,” New York Times, November 23, 2006.
perhaps at its all-time low: On November 29, 2006, the New York Times published a memo written on November 8 by National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley. He wrote, “Despite Maliki’s reassuring words . . . the reality on the streets of Baghdad suggests Maliki is either ignorant of what is going on, misrepresenting his intentions, or that his capabilities are not yet sufficient to turn his good intentions into action.”
assaulting the Ministry of Health: Kirk Semple, “Sectarian Attack Is Worst in Baghdad Since Invasion,” New York Times, November 24, 2006.
another 250 wounded: Casualty figures are from Associated Press, “Death Toll in Sadr City Rises to 202 Iraqis,” USA Today, November 24, 2006.
hold that record for long: On August 15, 2007, four car bombs killed 250 and wounded 350. James Glanz, “Death Toll in Iraq Bombings Rises to 250,” New York Times, August 15, 2007.
Ansar al-Sunnah’s leadership: Information on the ten captured leaders comes from an MNF-I press release: Multi-National Force–Iraq, “Capture of Terrorist Emirs Gives al-Qaida in Iraq Nowhere to Turn” (press release), December 6, 2006.
mess-hall tent in Mosul: Ansar al-Sunnah was the biggest and most violent indigenous Iraqi insurgent group that had a pro–bin Laden ideology. Prior to the U.S. invasion, AAS had set up a Taliban-like enclave in the ungoverned parts of Kurdistan, banning music, dancing, and liquor, as reported, for example, by C. J. Chivers, “Kurds Face a Second Enemy: Islamic Fighters on Iraq Flank,” New York Times, January 13, 2003.
Kurdish leaders had reported: Interview with task force member aware of intelligence on this matter.
merger between the two groups: Bill Roggio, “A Zarqawi Letter and a Potential Merger with Ansar al-Sunnah,” Long War Journal, September 21, 2006.
These were conversations: Details of these meetings with Abu Wail come from interviews with Graeme Lamb.
“you’re a face of occupation”: Interview with Graeme Lamb. Note that this quote from Abu Wail has elsewhere been incorrectly attributed to Abu Azzam (Fairweather, A War of Choice, 294). In fact, it came from the Ansar religious emir.
FSEC’s first strategic release: The timing of Abu Wail’s release comes from interviews with members of FSEC.
“Annie, another Christmas apart”: E-mail to Annie, December 25, 2006. Edited slightly for punctuation.
new strategy in Iraq: George W. Bush, Decision Points (Crown, 2010), 377.
stretching back to the spring: Peter D. Feaver, “The Right to Be Right: Civil-Military Relations and the Iraq Surge Decision,” International Security (Spring 2011), 101.
believed Al Shabab was sheltering: Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Bin Laden’s Legacy: Why We’re Still Losing the War on Terror (John Wiley and Sons, 2011), 148.
Abu Taha al-Sudani: Bill Roggio, “U.S. Gunship Fires on Al Qaeda Leader and Operative in Somalia,” Long War Journal, January 8, 2007.