each time we acted: The New York Times reported that on December 9, 2004, a Pentagon spokesman said four SOF personnel had been given “administrative punishments” for “unauthorized use of [a] Taser.” Thom Shanker, “For Abuse of Detainees, Military Disciplines 4 in Special Unit,” New York Times, December 9, 2004.
help spur civil war: Stathis Kalyvas makes the case that given how infrequently insurgents control cities (preferring rural areas), the inability for the United States to “pacify” cities (like Samarra or Ramadi) from 2003 to 2005 was an indicator of far too few troops spread too thinly around Iraq. Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 133.
from or around the sites: Additional details regarding Named Area of Interest 152 came through interviews with four task force members involved in intelligence.
90 percent Sunni population: Multi-National Force–Iraq, “Operational Update,” February 23, 2006.
before his disappearance: Robert F. Worth, “Blast at Shiite Shrine Sets Off Sectarian Fury in Iraq,” New York Times, February 23, 2006.
seven o’clock that morning: Ibid.
Thousands of men: Ellen Knickmeyer and K. I. Ibrahim, “Bombing Shatters Mosque in Iraq,” Washington Post, February 23, 2006.
backs of flatbed trucks: Worth, “Blast at Shiite Shrine.”
torched or strafed with bullets: Ellen Knickmeyer and Bassam Sebti, “Toll in Iraq’s Deadly Surge: 1,300,” Washington Post, February 28, 2006.
a thousand Iraqis: Ibid.
bag used to suffocate them: Ibid.
teams landed at NAI 152: Additional details, including the exact times and casualties at NAI 152, come from interviews with members of the task force, including a senior intelligence official.
bound for Baghdad’s streets: Interview with task force member involved in intelligence.
knew something was awry: Significant details regarding the interrogation of these detainees came from extensive interviews with multiple task force members.
eighteen thousand detainees: Michael O’Hanlon and Ian Livingston, “Iraq Index,” Brookings Institution, January 31, 2012, 12.
aliases was Yusif al-Dardiri: Ellen Knickmeyer and Jonathan Finer, “Maliki Aide Who Discussed Amnesty Leaves Job,” Washington Post, June 16, 2006.
“en route to that objective”: Quoted in Sean Naylor, “SpecOps Unit Nearly Nabs Zarqawi,” Army Times, April 28, 2006.
raising al-Masri’s profile: On May 16, 2006, Rumsfeld sent a memo to Hadley, Rice, Negroponte, Pace, Abizaid, Ambassador Zal Khalilzad, and Eric Edelman on this subject: “Have received a proposal from George Casey and John Abizaid recommending that we make some adjustments in the current $25 million reward for Abu Musab al Zarqawi (AMZ). Their goal is to try to marginalize AMZ in the eyes of the Iraqi people by reducing his stature and forcing him to act to regain it, with the thought that this might increase his visibility and vulnerability.” He sent a second memo on May 24, 2006, outlining how it would be publicly announced. Both have the subject “Reward for Zarqawi” and are available from the Rumsfeld Papers website.
CHAPTER 13: HIBHIB
auditorium inside the Green Zone: Dexter Filkins and Richard A. Oppel, Jr., “Iraqis Form Government, with Crucial Posts Vacant,” New York Times, May 21, 2006.
group of Sunnis storming out: Ibid.