“I understand,” I said, turning my head slowly to make eye contact with each of the men. “Your conditions represent our intentions for this operation.” And they did. We had crafted Moshtarak to drive out the enemy and simultaneously reassure Afghans across the country that we intended to focus on their protection.
As we met, I was judging the elders’ sincerity and legitimacy in representing the desires their district’s people. As the international community had learned through painful missteps over the previous eight years, it could be difficult to identify real leaders in war-jumbled Afghanistan. Wealth, clothing, or fluency in English were false indicators. And dealing with men mistrusted or hated by the population was not only ineffective; it made us appear either complicit or clueless.
The elders were conducting their own assessment—whether this time would be different. Whether for the first time since the high expectations of 2001 our efforts would both succeed and provide permanent change. They recognized our power and probably our sincerity. But they also knew that for us and the nations we represented, our time in Afghanistan was finite. I suspected they harbored doubts.
With my statement, the meeting ended with head nods, two-handed handshakes, and right hands touching hearts. We were ready to go.
* * *
At Palace Number 2, a few minutes after we were all present, President Karzai appeared. He was friendly and gracious as usual, but fatigue and the effects of his cold streaked his face. He asked how I was, thanked me for coming, and then asked me directly the purpose and importance of the meeting I’d requested.
I reminded him about the January 21 briefing Major General Nick Carter, the British RC-South commander, and his Afghan counterpart, Brigadier General Sher Mohammad Zazai, had given him in the National Security Conference Room in the palace. At that time, with all Karzai’s ministers, Rod, Mark Sedwill, and me in attendance, Nick and Zazai had explained Moshtarak in detail. Mark Sedwill has recently moved from being Great Britain’s capable ambassador to Afghanistan to be my civilian counterpart as NATO’s senior civilian representative in Kabul. After the brief, President Karzai had asked some pertinent questions and issued appropriate guidance. My objective had been to bring him increasingly into an active role as commander-in-chief, and immersing him in the tactical plan felt like a good step forward.
Now, three weeks later, I looked at him directly. “Mr. President, the forces are in position and ready to launch the operation tonight, but I won’t do so without your approval.”
It was a critical moment. President Karzai glanced briefly at his key leaders and then turned back to me.
“General McChrystal, you’ll have to forgive me. I’ve never been asked to approve this kind of operation before.”
His statement spoke volumes. On one level, I think he questioned the genuineness of my request, fearing it was a charade to put a fig leaf, or “Afghan face,” on what was still an entirely Coalition-controlled operation. That would push him yet further into the puppet-ruler role he feared for himself and for his nation.
But on another level, I think President Karzai knew me well enough by that evening to decide I was sincere. And if so, this operation and his decision represented a paradigm shift, or at least the start of one. He’d never been allowed or encouraged to assume this role, and we’d have to be patient while he and his team grew into it. The decision would affect some one hundred thousand Afghans who made their home in and around Marjah.
Since he’d assumed the presidency in the fall of 2001, Coalition forces had rarely invited any substantive planning or execution by Afghan forces when conducting military operations in Afghanistan. While never asked to be a real commander-in-chief, Karzai, brought his own hesitations, as well. He had an instinctive aversion to violence—not squeamishness, but something he came to intellectually. Even during the heady days of October 2001, when he crossed into Afghanistan on a motorbike to raise an anti-Taliban tribal rebellion, he had delegated military matters to his compatriot Jan Mohammad Khan, and instead concentrated on inspiring political and tribal support. Over the past eight years Karzai had come to view it as the Coalition’s war against foreign terrorists, which we fought on his land, among his people. As leader of the country, he was reluctant to classify the Taliban as a largely Afghan insurgency against his government. This was an attitude that needed to change. We both knew that approving Moshtarak, an operation in which Coalition forces were still the strongest component, was not going to transform his role and attitude about the war overnight. But it was an important start.