My Share of the Task(218)
Gathered with me were Afghanistan’s security-sector leadership, including Minister of Defense Rahim Wardak; Minister of the Interior Hanif Atmar; Director Amrullah Saleh of the NDS, Afghanistan’s intelligence service; and General Bismullah Mohammedi, or “BK,” as he was known, Afghanistan’s army chief. I found it a comfortable group. In the seven months since I’d arrived, military operations, the elections, and efforts to grow Afghanistan’s security forces had brought us into almost daily interaction.
The president was expected down shortly, and we chatted in subdued voices. We’d never met in the president’s home before, and I felt slightly guilty having first requested, and then demanded, the evening meeting. The president kept his family life private, and I knew that invading his home that night was an imposition. I also knew he was sick in bed with a cold, but I felt my purpose was important enough to warrant it.
Earlier in the day I had pushed this meeting to secure his final approval for the launch of Operation Moshtarak, the next major step in the campaign we’d begun in June 2009 to reassert Afghan government control over the Helmand River valley. Operation Moshtarak (Dari for “together”) was also an advancement in the integration of ISAF and Afghan forces in operations. As we waited, talking through details of the operation, Coalition and Afghan forces were marshaled with vehicles and helicopters some 360 miles southwest, in Helmand. They were poised to begin with a dramatic encircling maneuver.
The operation that awaited them was to be a complex and tedious counterinsurgency. It required they seal off, then clear Marjah, a locale about the size of Washington, D.C., that included gridded urban areas, interlinked bazaars, and agricultural fields, all crisscrossed by a series of irrigation canals designed by American engineers in the 1950s and 1960s. Then the difficult work of local governance and development programs had to begin. The population had to see the benefit of supporting the Taliban’s expulsion.
The campaign in Helmand had really begun with the British assault on Babaji the previous June. But the added attention Afghanistan had received from Washington and Europe since then had increased anew with President Obama’s December 1 announcement of additional forces. The leadership in Coalition capitals expected these forces be quickly employed, and there was an appetite for an operation with rapid, observable impact.
Before I had arrived at the palace, I’d spoken with General Rod. If we didn’t relay a go to the field commanders by 9 P.M., we couldn’t start the operation that night. And the weather the next day, he’d said, was not good. We’d have to delay twenty-four hours. We’d lose tactical surprise and Taliban defensive preparations would continue. More IEDs would be buried. The soldiers and Marines who were gathering then in the dark, double-checking equipment, steeling themselves, would be told to marinate another day.
It was now after 7 P.M.
* * *
A few days earlier, I’d traveled to the city of Lashkar Gah, Helmand’s provincial capital, and met with elders from Marjah who had come from their district to discuss the impending operation with us.
“We support the operation to liberate our district, but only if it can be done following three important conditions,” a bearded elder in a turban said in a clearly rehearsed statement.
“First, the operation must be conducted in a manner that avoids killing civilians or destroying our homes.
“Second,” he continued, “when it is completed, the corrupt police that have preyed upon us cannot be allowed to return.
“Finally, if you come, you must stay. If you don’t, the Taliban will return and we,” he said, gesturing to his colleagues in the room, “will all be killed.”
This was classic counterinsurgency. From frightened, vulnerable strangers, I was asking for a leap of faith.