My Share of the Task(213)
“You can’t roll up your sleeves while you’re wringing your hands,” Graeme would aptly remark.
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The increasing friction between the United States and Afghanistan was painfully evident a few weeks later, on October 20, in a press conference from the presidential palace. At the podium President Karzai appeared flanked by U.S. and Afghan flags, Senator John Kerry, Ambassador Karl Eikenberry, and U.N. special representative Kai Eide. A month before, the Afghan government’s electoral body had announced Karzai had won 55 percent of the vote, compared to Abdullah’s 28 percent, initially making it appear Karzai had avoided a runoff and gained a significant mandate beyond his Pashtun base. But the independent U.N.-backed monitor, the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC), announced widespread fraud. The day before, the ECC had announced revised numbers, which put Karzai at less than 50 percent. Now he reluctantly agreed to accept a runoff election. In Afghan society, where a leader’s personal stature and presence mattered, the press conference may have reinforced the image of Karzai as a puppet of the West—a portrayal that I knew cut him to his core. Less than two weeks later, the runoff was canceled when Dr. Abdullah withdrew over concerns the second round of voting would be no less susceptible to fraud than the first.
Although blame for getting to that point could fairly be spread far and wide, the scar tissue, particularly the indignation that Karzai felt, was deep and permanent. The mistrust on both sides became a critical issue, further hindering the partnership between NATO and Afghans and eroding confidence in the viability of the mission.
Despite the controversy, and perhaps more so because of it, I increasingly made my relationship with Karzai a priority and sought to base it on genuine respect. I was aware of his flaws, and the allegations against his brothers. I had seen him exhibit both impressive and poor leadership in my first three months. But I increasingly understood the unique challenges of the physical and political environment in which he had to work to make the partnership to which NATO, America, and Afghanistan had committed as effective as possible.
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My close relationship with Dave Rodriguez remained important to me on both a personal and a professional level. Whenever I could, often at the end of trips to locations across the country, I’d land at Kabul’s airport and walk the two hundred meters to Rod’s headquarters to see him for a few minutes before I moved across the city to ISAF’s compound. We’d developed the strategy together and were now partners in implementing it. Sitting in his small office, we would often compare notes and talk candidly about the war. Seeing the poster-size photo Rod kept of his son, Andrew, whom I’d known from birth, in his West Point football uniform, I’d remember all Rod was missing.
Late one evening after flying back from Kandahar at the beginning of November, two months into the president’s review process, I went to Rod’s office and became aware of a set of cables U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry had recently sent. In them, he raised a number of questions and concerns on the troop increase and the Afghans’ ability to take responsibility for their country in a reasonable time frame. I would later learn that he had written these at the request of Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in order to provide her with a candid and personal assessment of the campaign. While I may not have agreed with Karl on all matters, I always valued his analysis and judgment, particularly given his years of government service in Afghanistan as a soldier and then as a statesman.
In the cables Karl voiced a number of reservations about the counterinsurgency approach and the impact of more troops, including the American public’s patience for a relatively long and expensive campaign. He expressed concerns that the U.S. civilian effort was underresourced: A recent request for increased funding by the embassy, he reminded Secretary Clinton, had been rejected. He also noted that NATO and the U.N.’s wider civilian effort remained uncoordinated and thus undermined—an unsettling reality when the civilian component needed to be an equal pillar in a joint counterinsurgency strategy.
But Karl’s strongest criticisms were of the Afghan government. He worried the Afghan army and police were unlikely to be able to establish and maintain security, and the Afghan government lacked the institutions and manpower to establish governance in areas we cleared. Combined with his reservations about President Karzai’s personal commitment and effectiveness, it was a powerful warning from a soldier-diplomat with extensive Afghan experience.