The political process moved roughly in parallel, although over an even rockier road. It left IEC director Dr. Azizullah Lodin, a quiet, courtly man, constantly buffeted by demands and accusations of impending problems.
* * *
As election day unfolded, in ISAF we were initially pleased with the result. Although the number of Taliban attacks was extremely high, the election was not effectively disrupted. The government opened roughly 90 percent of the polling sites that it had planned to, and on the day of the election, violence or threats inactivated just 12 percent of those originally opened to voters. While hard numbers were scarce, between 35 percent and 39 percent of voters turned out. Fewer people voted than we had hoped for or anticipated—particularly in Helmand and Kandahar.
In most provinces the Afghan army and police had performed admirably. They were out in more areas simultaneously than most of my commanders had ever seen, and the Afghans had taken impressive responsibility for security.
Our guarded satisfaction didn’t survive long. Almost immediately there were accusations of fraud, ballot stuffing, and other improprieties. Opposition candidates complained, as did many election monitors. Unquestionably, many of the complaints were valid, but I couldn’t judge whether these were typical warts of the democratic process or indicators of a “stolen election.” President Karzai, the incumbent and clear Pashtun candidate in a country that was 42 percent Pashtun, hardly needed fraud to be reelected. But he had sought a convincing mandate. I had no doubt that some of his supporters had, with or without his direction, taken it upon themselves to ensure success by any means they considered necessary.
The entire process had been flawed, and recriminations abounded. U.N. special representative Kai Eide’s public break with his deputy, Peter Galbraith, and President Karzai’s rage at Ambassadors Richard Holbrooke and Karl Eikenberry increased the toxicity in the atmosphere. Most worrisome, the international community’s disgust with apparent fraud led many to call into question the feasibility of our effort in Afghanistan. Although the outcome of the election and the health of the government mattered greatly to our mission, my position as military commander allowed, indeed required, that I stay out of the particular postelection political fray.
* * *
On an early morning at the end of August, I took my regular run around the compound. The tiny enclave made for monotonous laps through alleys and behind buildings and still came up well short of a mile. It wasn’t fun running, like an interesting city could be. But it was an opportunity to take stock of what we’d done and where I thought we were.
The aftermath of the elections was becoming a mess. Although the vote count was still ongoing, I could sense a looming political crisis. But there were also reasons for optimism. ISAF was becoming a different organization. We hadn’t changed the culture entirely, but we were transforming to a more focused team. When the ISAF Joint Command became active late in September, I expected ISAF would be able to mold itself more effectively toward the strategic role that was needed.
Across Afghanistan, ISAF’s operational focus on protecting the people wasn’t complete. But there were improvements. The U.S. Marines and Brits in Helmand were producing change, not through miracles that suddenly appeared, but through muddy, often bloody fights under the eyes of skeptical locals, followed by patient engagement. It was two steps forward, very carefully taken to avoid IEDs, and one step backward. But it was real progress. On battlefield visits I’d hear my own words on counterinsurgency echoed back to me by young leaders, often unaware of their origin. With more time, and Rod’s leadership, I was confident that sustainable improvement was possible.
We had submitted the strategic assessment on August 30, and I was comfortable with the analysis and recommendations. Although the war was not easy to describe clearly in a document, I felt we had captured the essence of the challenges and risks we faced. More daunting was assessing whether the mission was achievable and what it would take to reach an acceptable outcome. I understood the tendency of military leaders to be optimistic, often dangerously so. But both our analysis and my intuition told me our effort could succeed. My responsibility was to provide my best military judgment, and I had done that. Not once in the months and years that followed did I feel we got it wrong. We now waited to see how Washington would receive the assessment.