My Share of the Task(199)

                To allow us to concentrate our limited ISAF and Afghan forces in the most important areas, the following month we began repositioning a number of units out of remote desert or mountain outposts, pulling them closer to the more populous geographic hubs. But what appeared a logical move was also politically sensitive and deeply emotional.

                In July 2009, at the passionate request of Nuristan’s governor and Minister Atmar, I had approved ISAF forces to reinforce Barg-e Matal, a district capital under Taliban attack in remote eastern Nuristan. I’d been on a patrol to the primitive mountain village with Navy SEALs back in December 2003 and remembered the faces of children who’d gathered to investigate the strangers. But I also remembered the hills that dominated the small garrison and knew long-term defense would be resource-intensive.

                With my concurrence, Major General Scaparrotti refined planning to reposition his limited forces to areas where we could better protect large population centers. That process was ongoing when, on the morning of October 3, 2009, Combat Outpost Keating, to the south of Barge-e Matal, was attacked and partially overrun with the loss of eight American soldiers killed and twenty-two wounded. The attack, which highlighted the vulnerability of small bases in difficult terrain, produced calls for rapid withdrawal from exposed positions. As a soldier I understood. But there were other factors to consider as well.

                In the early years of the war we had occupied areas that we subsequently abandoned. Afghans who had enthusiastically supported our initial arrival were left vulnerable upon our departure; their hope for the future and our credibility were left shattered as either insurgents or despised warlords moved in. In areas where we reappeared in 2006 and 2007, we encountered cautiously distant attitudes. Departing again would complete their disillusionment. Additionally, even the appearance of ceding territory once under government control was a troubling proposition for Afghan leaders. Traditional military calculations had to be balanced with the psychological effects of every decision. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan was more complex than moving military symbols on a map.

                The Soviets had opted for a version of the “ink spot” strategy during the late stages of their war, as had the Najibullah government that the Soviets left behind. While the Soviets’ failure tended to make their actions a cautionary tale rather than a road map for us, aspects of Soviet “pacification” efforts had been successful in engaging the populace. But the “sovietization” efforts they’d enacted within the areas they controlled had offended many conservative Afghans. This offense, and the Soviets’ aggressive use of fires in the areas they had ceded control of, undermined their strategy. It was a reminder that we could get the strategy partly, or even mostly, right—and still fail.

                Our planners worked hard to determine what was needed to secure the key eighty districts. When we began the process, which I asked Dave Rodriguez to oversee, both he and I had believed no additional forces would be required. We thought, or at least hoped, that the ISAF forces already approved and the projected growth of the Afghan army and police, would be sufficient. But through extensive research, including computer simulations using historical counterinsurgency models, the planners presented evidence indicating otherwise.

                Their convincing analysis argued that at least forty thousand troops would be required to establish enough security in enough areas to achieve progress that was credible to Afghans and fast enough to arrest and then reverse the deteriorating situation around the country.

                Rod and I struggled with this conclusion. We knew it would be politically contentious, and we challenged the planners repeatedly. But by the end of July, I was convinced that to accomplish the mission we’d been given within the time frame we thought we had, we’d need additional U.S. and NATO forces. Without them, we were unable to halt the insurgency’s momentum and buy time until the still-nascent Afghan forces were both big and effective enough to stave off the insurgency and allow the Afghan state to survive. The only other option, as I saw it, was to alter the mission and objectives.