My Share of the Task(179)

                Forging an ad hoc multinational force into a cohesive team was always challenging, as Dwight Eisenhower had found. In ISAF we not only needed to construct a countrywide battle rhythm of daily processes to synchronize the fight, we also needed to reframe an effort originally intended more for peacekeeping than a coordinated war against an insurgency. For many nations whose domestic constituents had never envisioned a combat role, the deteriorating security situation was a difficult reality. I probably increased concerns by bringing a high-energy team of experienced war fighters into what had been a more deliberate headquarters atmosphere. But I didn’t see another option to move as quickly as I felt necessary.

                We would have to make these changes while conducting ongoing and planned operations. In this case that included not only ever-more-violent daily combat around Afghanistan but also the campaign just then beginning in southern Afghanistan’s Helmand Province. Additionally, we had to prepare for the upcoming presidential elections in late August. These were significant endeavors, larger than anything in Afghanistan since 9/11.

                To lessen the gap between what we knew and what we needed to know about the world beyond our walls and windows, Mike Flynn and I determined to establish regular “feeds” that would combine hard, often classified reporting with the perspectives of units, media, and other excellent sources of data. Experience had taught me that commanders too often relied on traditional intelligence reports and focused on metrics such as insurgents killed and levels of violence. But understanding the broader picture required accurately gauging the attitude of the people, levels of economic activity, and, most challenging, indicators of deviations from “normalcy.” For many Afghans, normal was a faint memory, long tattered by violence that had come to define the image of a country that had enjoyed nearly fifty years of peace prior to the 1978 coup. A normal life, protected from government predations and insurgent threats, was still the goal for those who remembered, or heard stories of, that time. Understanding how Afghans defined normal, and gauging whether they believed we were moving toward it, could help us engage them effectively and win their support.

                Almost immediately, Mike began building a network capable of providing this kind of holistic ground truth. One tactic was to empower talented observers, like a brilliant Marine lieutenant named Matt Pottinger, to circulate through the country and provide unvarnished reports. Matt’s background as a journalist, including seven years in China, combined with experience in both Iraq and Afghanistan, made him prototypical of the informal side of Mike’s network.

                But, as I always had, I wanted to see for myself. I remembered first reading about Afghanistan many years before in a paperback version of James Michener’s 1963 novel Caravans. The advice offered to a young American girl seemed more prescient every day I spent in Afghanistan: “Ask a lot of questions. Learn the country. Don’t be afraid of looking stupid, because one of these days we could be driven into war across this terrain, and you’d be the only American who’d ever seen parts of it. Keep your eyes open.” Those words, as well as all my experience in Iraq, told me that to understand, you must first be quiet and listen. In that spirit, I determined to conduct an immediate listening tour around Afghanistan, to hear directly from Afghans and ISAF personnel.


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                The first few days in Kabul, before I began the listening tour, were a whirlwind. I met with other Western leaders in Kabul, including U.S. ambassador Karl Eikenberry, as well as officials from NATO, the U.N., and ISAF nations. But my most important visit was to President Hamid Karzai on June 14, the day after I arrived in his country.

                I’d never met Karzai, but I had watched from afar his evolution as his nation’s chief executive. I sensed he had grown frustrated working with foreign governments and organizations that both provided necessary assistance and applied constant pressure. But a strong relationship with him was essential. On the recommendation of one of my aides, I put on my green army service dress uniform, one I typically wore only when forced to do so. I wanted to show respect for Afghanistan’s head of state.