My Share of the Task(161)

                For the past six years, the hunt for bin Laden had included doggedly persistent efforts by a variety of individuals and agencies around the globe. I watched extraordinarily complex and clever technical initiatives employed to track devices, multidisciplinary analysis leveraged to predict and locate potential hiding spots, and daring human intelligence operations conducted to identify potential sources who might lead us, as Sheikh Rahman had with Zarqawi, to the elusive Al Qaeda leader. But his apparent discipline in avoiding phones and Internet and limiting personal interaction had left behind only theories to his whereabouts, and a mostly cold trail.

                We were unable to verify the limited but tantalizing hints that bin Laden might appear at Tora Bora but also unwilling to ignore that there was to be a confirmed gathering of insurgents there. So I moved my headquarters temporarily to Afghanistan, and over a period of more than a month we refined our intelligence about the area, then conducted an operation—Valiant Pursuit—to search and clear known or likely insurgent pockets. The initial phases were intense as we focused an unprecedented array of ISR surveillance aircraft, manned and unmanned, over the area, with a particular focus on mapping every communication signal being transmitted. It provided a fascinating, if still inconclusive, picture of insurgent activity, and we subsequently conducted helicopter insertion of Rangers and SEALs on initial targets, some at extraordinarily high altitudes.

                Bin Laden wasn’t there, as I’d doubted he would be. But the operation worked to shut down insurgent sanctuaries inside Afghanistan, a critical goal in counterinsurgency. As was so often the case in this long war, however, the relationships we in TF 714 forged with Dave Rodriguez’s paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne Division—then in charge of eastern Afghanistan—were invaluable. Rod was quickly accumulating more time in Afghanistan than any other general officer, and the importance of my friendship with him would be fully apparent to me only a year later.


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                Back in Iraq, Dave Petraeus and Ryan Crocker worked hard to manage our relationship with Prime Minister Maliki. Although supportive of aggressive targeting of Sunni extremists, the Iraqi prime minister remained skittish about going after Shia. On several occasions Dave sent me to Baghdad to brief Maliki on TF 714’s operations and to make our case for confronting the Shia groups.

                Each occasion was almost exactly the same. Armed with a briefing book of PowerPoint slides summarizing recent operations, their effects, and the intelligence that underpinned our targeting, I’d pass through Iraqi security and sit in a large meeting room with chairs arranged in a rectangle along the walls. There was no main table, and when the prime minister arrived we sat side-by-side with a small table in front of us on which I laid the book.

                Maliki was always cordial but not effusive and seemed to know little about my force. Sometimes Dave’s trusted cultural adviser Sadi, and on occasion Ryan, sat in and interpreted. Each time I reminded Maliki who my force was and what we did, and then started with a summary of our operations against Sunni extremists. Maliki asked few questions but nodded energetically in agreement as he listened to my accounts of raids and the effects they had against AQI, Ansar al-Sunnah, and other insurgent groups. For that part of the brief I felt the glow of approval.

                Then I’d flip to the section on Shia groups and he’d perceptibly stiffen, almost recoil. I’d review the operations, emphasizing the accuracy of our intelligence, and, seeking to convince him of the necessity of the effort, I’d review information we’d gotten from captured documents and interrogations. He remained civil, but it was a hard sell. He clearly understood and accepted the overall premise, but in many cases, we were targeting his constituents.

                On Sunday, October 21, 2007, my aide Chris Fussell stopped by my office during the first part of the morning, while I was still in the gym, to get a jump on any pressing issues. The operations center was in its quiet lull, a few hours after dawn. As usual, Chris checked in with the daytime operations officer, who gave a rundown of the previous night’s raids.