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As I had done with Casey, I flew down to Baghdad every Friday that I was in Iraq to meet with General Petraeus and the other senior commanders. Part of the battle for Baghdad had already been fought, without the Coalition. By the spring of 2007, Shia militias methodically pushing westward had ethnically cleansed many of the neighborhoods. Flags of different colors flapped on rooftops of different neighborhoods. In an attempt to stem the violence, long lines of tall blast barriers segmented neighborhoods as the Coalition walled off the city into a honeycomb of cement-encircled enclaves to immobilize the roving militias and cars packed to the brim with bombs. The city felt like it was slowly dying.
Upon arrival at Camp Victory, we drove to the Water Palace, headquarters of both MNF-I and its subordinate command Multi-National Corps–Iraq, or MNC-I. Al Faw was an imposing marble structure perched in the middle of a turquoise man-made lake. As we passed armed guards and entered the cool, cavernous foyer of polished marble floors, I often had images of General Allenby in Cairo, a soldier on the edge of the empire.
As George Casey had done, Dave met with key subordinates for an informal lunch discussion. Around a rectangular table with Dave at the head sat his deputy, Graeme Lamb; his senior enlisted adviser, Command Sergeant Major Marvin Hill; three-star operational commanders Ray Odierno leading MNC-I, Jim Dubik at the Multi-National Security Transition Comamand–Iraq, and me at TF 714; and the key one- and two-star generals responsible for contracting, public affairs, engineering, detainee operations, and other functions. The talk was all business, but unscripted. It was an important time to bring busy leaders together.
As was evident in our weekly meetings, one facet of Dave Petraeus’s genius was to scan an often-cluttered field, recognize a good thing or an able commander, and throw his personal energy and hunger and the brunt of his organization behind it. He scrambled to capitalize on the emerging Awakening movement, creating the Sons of Iraq program and giving Graeme greater latitude. In a campaign where demonstrable progress was essential, Dave’s ability to create or harness energy was indispensable.
After lunch, a group of us moved the short distance across the massive inner hall to Dave’s office. There we’d provide a detailed update on TF 714’s operations and current read of the fight. I’d typically bring my operations officer, Kurt Fuller, my intel chief, Mike Flynn or his replacement Gregg Potter, as well as one or two key leaders from TF 16. I wanted Petraeus to interact directly with my team often to build as much confidence as possible in our effort.
Beginning in the spring of 2007, at the conclusion of our TF 714 update we would conduct a second meeting to discuss the work of FSEC. Graeme and his team would provide an update and then propose potential prisoner releases—including, in late March, Abu Mustafa, the Iraqi emir of Ansar. These were difficult decisions, and each of us came into the room from a different vantage of the fight, and with different baggage.
Although he had undisputed bona fides, being a Brit handicapped Graeme. As America was surging, it became clear that Gordon Brown’s new administration in London was anxious to withdraw. To some, the Brits appeared to have lost Basra by the start of 2007. By the time Graeme left his post in July, Whitehall had ordered the bases in Basra to be packed up, and the last British convoy from the south departed to the airport in September. In this light, the reconciliation Graeme was pushing could have appeared more like a British-concocted scheme to save face, rather than what it was—a vital component of an aggressive surge.
But not being an American also bore advantages. Although officially the deputy commander, as a Brit, Graeme could maneuver with less concern over American sensitivities or internal politics. His nationality allowed him to say and do things that few Americans could have, and that was invaluable for the effort.
In the discussions, although committed to the process, Ray Odierno harbored serious concerns about the strategic releases. He had been leading the day-to-day battle since December and was the one writing stacks of condolence letters to families of the fallen that spring, when fighting claimed 81 Americans in March. The number of envelopes waiting on his desk would increase that summer, as 104 Americans died in April and 126 in May. More than 600 were wounded each of these months. In one discussion, Ray objected to the release of men like Abu Mustafa, who had American and British blood on their hands.