| CHAPTER 15 |
The Long War
February 2007–June 2008
On February 10, 2007, General George Casey turned over command of MNF-I to General Dave Petraeus. Because I avoided public events in Iraq and Afghanistan while commanding TF 714, I didn’t attend the morning ceremony. But I flew down in time to say good-bye to General Casey before he left the country. We met after the ceremony in a guesthouse he was using before departing for the States. After two and a half years together in Iraq, a bond had been forged between us through countless difficult moments. Ever balanced and upbeat, Casey expressed his appreciation for all our force had done. I presented him with a small memento from TF 714.
It was important for me to communicate my appreciation for his stoicism and support of my team. We both knew that in the years ahead he’d receive less credit and more blame than he deserved, but that often went with the territory. He had been rock solid—the epitome of a professional throughout his time in command.
A month later, John Abizaid ended his tenure as commander of CENTCOM, having served for nearly four years at the post. A narrative arose of a fresh start after failed leadership. Some press and pundits picked up on the theme as grist for the media mill.
That was a simplistic binary to which I couldn’t subscribe. I tended not to personalize mistakes, as there were plenty to go around. I certainly had made my share. In hindsight, the strategy we’d all been executing was insufficient. John had long argued that the very presence of Americans in the country had instigated the violence, providing a nationalistic insurgency with a raison d’être. Based on my experience, this was hard to dispute. He felt that by limiting our footprint and accelerating our withdrawal, we could avoid producing antibodies. Similarly, George Casey’s strategy was to quickly raise the capacity of Iraqis to secure and govern their country. What few accurately anticipated was the devastating sectarianism that quickly contorted the conflict from a largely one-directional Sunni antigovernment fight to what became a brutal civil war. In the end, the surreal levels of violence that sectarianism produced were too much for the Iraqi government, which needed American force to subdue it.
Could things have been different? Of course. We learned and improved, but in February 2007, we had to navigate from where we were, not from where we wished we were.
Both John Abizaid and George Casey had guided the effort through difficult times, and both had given unfailing, critical support to TF 714. The incredibly lethal targeting machine that Dave Petraeus would soon have at his disposal would not have existed without their guidance. As I saw the often-simplistic criticism directed at them, I remembered what retired General Fred Franks, the one-legged general who led a corps in the first Gulf War, had once told me.
“Remember, no matter what you do during your service, or what you accomplish, your last interaction with the Army,” he said quietly, “will be one of rejection.”
For years I mistook Franks’s comment as one of bitterness. Over time I realized he was admonishing me against looking for esteem in the wrong places. And he was reminding me whose respect was truly important.
* * *
That month also marked the end of Sean MacFarland’s tour commanding in Ramadi. I had returned regularly to the embattled city over the previous nine months, but during one visit I was struck by the feedback I received.
“Ethan,” I asked the SEAL squadron commander I knew so well, “how is it going now?”
“Sir,” he said passionately, “the change is eye-watering.”
I cocked my head. “In what way? Good or bad?”
“Eye-watering good, sir,” he said. Ethan outlined the changes he and his SEALs were seeing up close. “Colonel MacFarland and his guys are taking Ramadi back.”