Mr Balfour's Poodle(55)

From this analysis a union  ist policy of retreat under protest seemed to follow quite automatically. But from Lord Lansdowne, whom later in January he thought he would like to see personally for a discussion of the union  ist position, the King obtained a rather different view. Asquith at first objected to this suggested audience and then, when the King persisted, reluctantly agreed. In 1909, before the Lord’s rejection of the Budget, the Prime Minister had taken the initiative in advising the King to see the Opposition leaders, but on this latter occasion, when the King’s own actions were to be central to the next phase of the constitutional struggle, Asquith thought that it would be difficult to draw a line between ‘desiring knowledge’ and ‘seeking advice’. He went so far as to draw up a formal minute for the King on the point.

‘The part to be played by the Crown in such a situation as now exists has happily been settled by the accumulated traditions and the unbroken practice of more than seventy years. It is to act upon the advice of the Ministers who for the time being possess the confidence of the House of Commons, whether that advice does or does not conform to the private and personal judgment of the Sovereign. … It follows that it is not the function of a Constitutional Sovereign to act as arbiter or mediator between rival parties and policies; still less to take advice from the leaders of both sides, with the view to forming a conclusion of his own.’c

The disputed audience took place at Windsor on January 29. Lansdowne showed himself unconvinced that the prerogative would if necessary be used, or that his task was to extricate his forces from a lost battle.

‘It (the creation of peers),’ he wrote in his note of the conversation, ‘was a step which I felt sure H.M. would be reluctant to take, and his Ministers not less reluctant to advise; and I thought it not unfair to say that, up to a certain point, we should be justified in bearing this fact in mind when considering whether it was desirable to offer resistance to the Government proposals.’

Later in the interview he showed that he had no desire to see the dispersal of the fog in which he was enveloped:

‘I thought it would be most unwise for any of those concerned, either H.M.G. or the Opposition, or, if I might be permitted to say so, H.M. himself, at this moment to commit themselves finally to any particular line of action, or above all to allow it to become known that they had so committed themselves.’

This distaste for decision arose primarily out of Lansdowne’s refusal fully to accept the finality of the election result. He realised that it made an immediate change of Government, necessarily involving another appeal to the country, out of the question. But he clung to the hope that if a conclusion could be postponed, the dispute might be shifted on to slightly different ground and a union  ist claim for yet a third election given some plausibility.

‘It might, however, happen, that as the situation developed, the issue might undergo a change,’ he told the King. ‘For example, supposing an amendment to be carried for the purpose of safeguarding the Constitution against a violent change during the time which, if the Bill became law, would pass before a reformed House of Lords could be called into existence, a new issue of the kind which I contemplated might arise. Was it conceivable that H.M.’s advisers would desire that he should create 500 peers for the purpose of resisting such a proposal?’d

Asquith had realised that this pitfall might be dug for him and was determined not to fall into it. Combined with his own understanding of the position, the promises which he had secured from the King in November gave him adequate protection against its dangers. The arrangement was, not that the Government should merely be protected against an outright rejection by the peers of the Parliament Bill, but that, provided an adequate victory at the election was secured, the King would use the prerogative if necessary to get the bill through in the form which the Government desired. Lansdowne was therefore clutching at what was hardly even a straw. But he preferred to do this rather than give a firm order to retreat. His tactic in consequence became one of delay. If the issue was brought to a head immediately his position was hopeless. He had to try to give it time to change, and this attempt was the motive behind most of his actions between January and July. The difficulty was that while he was delaying many of his followers were busily and ostentatiously digging themselves into positions from which retreat was impossible.

The new Parliament was opened by the King on February 6, and the Parliament Bill—in exactly the same form that it had been presented in the previous Parliament—was taken immediately after the Address. It was read a first time on February 22, by a vote of 351 to 227. The union  ist leaders in the Lords replied with the only delaying manoeuvre of which they could think. They decided to press on further with a scheme for reform. Lord Newton has described how ‘the party wire-pullers became extremely active, and much pressure was exerted to induce the House of Lords to introduce a Reform Bill at the earliest opportunity. The Whips were very insistent that a Bill should be brought in at once, and in their zeal went so far as to urge that a bad Bill was better than nothing, and that unless something was done promptly the party would be completely smashed.’e