The problem of constitutional or ‘organic’ legislation raised still greater difficulties. The union ists wanted bills which fell within this category and which had twice been rejected by the House of Lords to be submitted to a referendum. Trouble here arose both over the definition of ‘organic’ bills and over the inherent dislike of the Liberal representatives, and particularly of the Prime Minister, for such an innovation as a plebiscite. Sir Harold Nicolson has commented that ‘the very word “referendum” would cause his (Asquith’s) usually tolerant features to writhe into an expression of contemptuous disgust’1jjj There is, indeed, no indication that the Government side was ever prepared to introduce this innovation. What they were prepared to do was entirely to exempt bills on certain subjects, which should be listed individually rather than left to arise out of the definition of a category, from the operation of the Parliament Act. The House of Lords would retain all its existing powers over such measures. Suggested for inclusion in the list were matters relating to the Crown or the Protestant Succession, or a bill to amend the Parliament Act itself.
Such a list did not satisfy the union ists (although Lansdowne, at least, believed that it was necessary to proceed by an extension of this method rather than by the general definition of ‘organic’ changes). They did not suspect the Government of wishing to abolish the Crown, or to change the Protestant Succession, or even, once its passage was secured, to amend the Parliament Bill. What they were interested in was Home Rule. This was a practical issue, and their dominant interest at the conference was to prevent the easing of its passage.
The Government was prepared to make some concession on this point. The Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed that, in the case of the next Home Rule Bill and of that one only, a first rejection by the Lords should be followed by an immediate general election. If the Government won, the bill would be proceeded with as ordinary legislation. If it lost, resignation would of course follow, but the next Liberal Government would not be prevented from proceeding with Home Rule under the ordinary provisions of the Parliament Act. This was not enough for the union ists. Balfour was able to argue with some trenchance that ‘we could not make ourselves responsible for a scheme which seemed to imply that, since the people had on three separate occasions expressed their hostility to Home Rule, it was high time to withdraw the subject from their cognizance and to hand it over to the unfettered discretion of the House of Commons and the joint sitting’.k ‘High time’ may have been an exaggerated phrase for a contingency which was most unlikely to arise within seven or eight years, but the compromise Liberal suggestion did lay the Government open, as tends to be the way with compromise suggestions, to a charge of some illogicality. Balfour suggested that, had the Government been willing to subject Home Rule to permanent special treatment, agreement might have been possible.
It was clear, however, that the Liberal representatives could go no further without estranging their supporters. Indeed, as early as October 14, Asquith had written to the King in the following terms:
‘Mr. Asquith regrets to say that the prospect of agreement is not so favourable as it appeared to be at the beginning of the week.… The point of divergence which has been reached is the question whether organic and constitutional changes (such e.g. as Home Rule, the franchise, redistribution) should be exempted from the procedure of joint sessions …; and should … be submitted to a popular referendum ad hoc.
‘The representatives of the Opposition insist on this distinction; the representatives of the Government are opposed to it, not only on its merits, but because they know it would be quite impossible to induce the Liberal Party to agree to it.l
After this letter was written the concession on Home Rule which has been mentioned was made. It therefore became doubly impossible further to give way, and when the concession was not accepted there was no alternative but for the conference to recognise its failure and break up. The question arises to how far the two sides were genuinely seeking an agreement and where the blame for failure to reach one must primarily lie. It cannot be adequately dealt with in simple generalisations about Liberals on the one hand and union ists on the other, but must rather be answered individually for the principal participants.
There can be little doubt that Asquith wanted an agreement. Austen Chamberlain, ‘to the end of his life’, in the words of his biographer, ‘… could never make up his mind whether the Prime Minister really wanted a compromise or was merely playing for time’;m but Austen, despite his political experience and his generous temperament, was capable of singular acts of incomprehension. Balfour, too, believed a story that the Master of Elibank had declared ‘the Government and his Party … so determined not to have an election till after the Coronation that they will keep the conference going till next year’.n But all the direct evidence was the other way. Asquith incurred some substantial unpopularity by commencing the conference.1 He ignored it throughout the course of the negotiations. He himself vigorously abstained from making any controversial public speeches. He advanced substantial and even dangerous concessions. He was continually optimistic. His temperament and the difficulties in which he would otherwise be involved with the King united to make him eager for a settlement. The summing up of his biographers is a fair one. ‘No one had better reasons for desiring a settlement than Asquith,’ they say, ‘but there came a point at which he felt constrained to say that he could not justify to his supporters the concessions which he was asked to make, if the machinery for settlement between the two Houses was not to apply to the questions in which they were most interested.’o